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The main thesis I shall try to defend in this paper is that, although
Dretske’s distinction between simple perception and cognitive
perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary
theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a
number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either
side of the divide. I shall argue that what is needed in order to give
a more accurate account of perceptual phenomena is not a twofold
distinction of the kind advocated by Dretske but a threefold distinc-
tion allowing for an intermediate level of perceptual content that is
structured and yet non-conceptual.
In the first section, I discuss Dretske’s distinction between
sensory perception and cognitive perception as well as a number
of attendant notions. In section 2, two sets of phenomena that seem
neither to constitute instances of sensory perception nor instances
of cognitive perception as defined by Dretske will be presented.
I argue that they are evidence in favor of the existence of an
intermediate level of perception. In section 3, I defend the view
that this intermediate level of content is a level of structured non-
conceptual perceptual content and I attempt to provide criteria for
distinguishing among the three levels of content.
1
This section offers a brief review of the successive stages in the
elaboration of the distinction between simple perception (non-
epistemic seeing) and cognitive perception (epistemic seeing), first
introduced by Dretske in Seeing and Knowing (1969). When he
introduced the distinction in 1969, Dretske’s main aim was to
isolate and describe a way of seeing, non-epistemic seeing, that does
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not depend on an organism’s higher-level cognitive and concep-
tual abilities. What he meant to capture was the purely sensory
dimension of our mental life, of our experience of the world. Non-
epistemic seeing was characterized in terms of two criteria, one
positive, the other negative. The negative criterion states that non-
epistemic seeing is devoid of cognitive content. In other words,
non-epistemic seeing, as opposed to epistemic seeing, is an ability
whose successful exercise does not involve, in any essential respect,
a particular belief or set of beliefs on the part of the perceiver.1
According to the positive criterion, a seer S sees non-epistemically
something D if and only if D is visually differentiated from its
immediate environment by S. This positive characterization of
non-epistemic seeing carries an important existential implication,
namely, in Dretske’s words: “if S seesn D, then there must be some-
thing satisfying the description or having the name, ‘D’, which S
seesn” (1969, p. 43). In this regard, seeingn D is like stepping on D,
both relationships require that D exists.
In later writings (1981, 1988), Dretske offers a treatment of
his distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception
in information-theoretical terms. The key notions introduced by
Dretske in Knowledge and the Flow of Information (1981) are the
analog versus digital modes of coding information. According to
Dretske’s use of the terms, a signal (structure, event, or state) will be
said to carry the information that s is F in digital form if and only if
the signal carries no additional information about s, no information
that is not already nested in s’s being F. Otherwise, the signal will
be said to carry information in analog form. Dretske contends that
the difference between our perceptual experience, the experience
that constitutes our seeing and hearing things and the perceptual
knowledge (or belief) that is normally consequent upon that experi-
ence is, fundamentally, a coding difference. Simple perception is the
process by means of which information is delivered within a richer
matrix of information (hence in analog from) to the cognitive centers
for their selective use. Cognitive activity, on the other hand, is the
conceptual mobilization of incoming information, and this concep-
tual treatment is fundamentally a matter of ignoring differences, of
abstracting, classifying, generalizing, hence, a matter of analog to
digital conversion.
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It should be noted, however, that although the contrast between
an analog and a digital encoding of information can be used to
distinguish between sensory and cognitive processes, it does not
give us the whole story. The informational story must be supple-
mented with a functional story. According to Dretske, for a system
to count as a perceptual system, it must also make this informa-
tion available to the larger system to which it belongs in order to
shape its responses.2 Similarly, no structure qualifies as a concept
unless it has both an informational aspect and a functional aspect.
According to Dretske, a semantic structure – a structure that carries
information in completely digitalized form – qualifies as a concep-
tual structure (hence as a belief) only insofar as its semantic content
is a causal determinant of output in the system in which it occurs.
Hence it does not qualify as a concept until there has been an
alignment of its representational and functional roles. Although
Dretske insists on the distinction between a semantic structure that
need not have an executive function and a conceptual structure that
qualifies as such only insofar as it has a control duty over behav-
ioral output, his account of the development of semantic structures
almost automatically ensures, at least in the case of natural systems
of representations, that those structures have a control duty over
behavior, and hence qualify as conceptual structures. This appears
most clearly in Dretske’s (1988) account of the acquisition by a
structure of an indicator function.3 On that account, a state type’s
acquiring an indicator function is conditional on its being recruited
for a control duty. Therefore, a semantic structure cannot fail to have
a functional aspect and hence to qualify as a concept.
Dretske’s latest elaboration on the distinction is to be found in his
1995 book, Naturalizing the mind. In this book, Dretske proposes
that we identify perceptual states as those states whose representa-
tional properties are systemic and whose function it is to supply
information to a cognitive system for calibration and use in the
control and regulation of behavior. A state is said to have a systemic
indicator function in case it derives its function from the system of
which it is a state. Such indicator functions are conceived as phylo-
genetically determined and are therefore fixed. By contrast, thoughts
and conceptual representations in general are identified with states
whose representational properties are acquired and whose executive
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function it is to control behavior. A state is said to have an acquired
indicator function if it derives its indicator function not from the
system of which it is a state, but from the type of state of which
it is a token. The representational properties of these states are
ontogenetically determined and, through learning, can change.
Critics have pointed out a number of difficulties raised by
Dretske’s account. Some philosophers (for instance, Heil, 1991)
have denied that there exists such a thing as simple seeing and have
contended that all seeing involves some form of seeing-as. Others
have put forward reasons for doubting that Dretske’s account of
(conceptual) content in terms of the notion of an indicator func-
tion is successful. For the moment, I won’t pursue those lines of
criticism. Indeed, for the sake of argument, I shall grant that we
enjoy both sensory and conceptual representations, as characterized
in Dretske’s account. What I shall dispute is the idea that the two
categories of sensory representations and conceptual representations
thus defined exhaust the realm of mental representations.
2
In order to motivate the need for at least a third category of
mental representations, a category that is irreducible either to the
category of sensory representations or to the category of conceptual
representations, I shall introduce and discuss two sets of examples.
The first type of case I want to discuss4 is that of certain optical
illusions such as the famous Müller-Lyer illusion (see Figure 1),
where a perceiver is presented with two lines of equal length, one
with arrows going in, the other with arrows going out. It is a well
known fact that, even though the perceiver knows that the two lines
are of equal length, she cannot help seeing them as unequal in
length. Thus, although the perceiver may believe that the two lines
are of equal length, the content of her perceptual experience is that
one is longer than the other.
Prima facie, this seems to pose a difficulty for Dretske. If he
contends that seeing one line as longer than the other is an instance
of cognitive perception, he must attribute two contradictory beliefs
to the perceiver: one belief with the content that one line is longer
than the other and another with the content that the two lines are
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Figure 1. Optical illusions.
of equal length. But this is implausible. It is surely more plausi-
ble to describe the situation as one where the perceiver is in two
states with both different modes and different contents: a perceptual
state with the content that one line is longer than the other and a
belief state with the content that the two lines are of equal length.
As remarked by Tim Crane (1992, pp. 150–151), it will not do
to explain the illusion in terms of a ‘prima facie but suppressed’
inclination to believe that one line is longer than the other, for what
such an account fails to explain is the difference between this state
and other, non-perceptual, inclinations to believe. Perceptions are
resilient to conclusive counter-evidence in a way that non-perceptual
inclinations to believe are not. Measuring the length of the lines
won’t make me see them as equal in length.
But can Dretske say that perceiving one line as longer than the
other is an instance of simple seeing? One difficulty with this view is
related to Dretske’s information-theoretic characterization of simple
seeing. To see s simply is characterized as being in a perceptual state
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that carries information about s. But when we see the Müller-Lyer
figure, the resulting perceptual state cannot contain the information
that the lines are of unequal length for the irresistible reason that
they are not. We seem to be left with the following two options.
Either we grant that the visual experience of the perceiver carries
information about the respective lengths of the two lines, and then
we must say that the perceiver sees simply two lines of equal length.
Or we can deny that the visual experience of the perceiver carries
definite information about the length of the two lines, and hence
what he sees simply are two lines of indeterminate length. What the
two options have in common is that they attribute three different
types of states to the perceiver and not just two: (1) an informational
state that encodes information about the two lines in an analog way,
information that defines what the perceiver simply sees, (2) a belief
state with the content that the two lines are of equal length, and (3)
a state with the content that the lines are of unequal length, a state
for which there is no room in Dretske’s taxonomy of mental states.
This criticism may be seen as unfair insofar as the notion of
a systemic indicator function developed in Dretske (1995) can be
thought to provide a simpler explanation of cases such as the Müller-
Lyer illusion. By identifying the content of a sensory state with what
it is the function of the state to carry information about, and not, as
he did earlier, with what it carries information about, Dretske seems
to make room for the possibility of sensory misrepresentation. A
state type can have the function of indicating that F, without all
its tokens carrying the information. Thus, we might say that the
sensory state a perceiver has when he sees the Müller-Lyer figure is a
token of a type whose function it is to carry, among other things, the
information that one line is longer than the other, but, as it happens,
a token that does not itself carry that information.5 Thus, Dretske
would not need to attribute contradictory beliefs to the perceiver. He
might say that the perceiver is both in a sensory state that represents
the two lines as unequal in length and in a belief state that represents
the two lines as of equal length. But such an answer also raises
problems.
First, one may wonder what becomes of the relation between
simple seeing and sensory experience. If Dretske wants to maintain
the claim that what is simply seen is what is sensorily represented,
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he must either abandon or revise the existence condition put forth in
Seeing and Knowing. Recall that the existence condition states that
if S seesn D, then there must be something satisfying the description.
To take the Müller-Lyer illusion once again, if Dretske wants to
claim that what is simply seen is what is sensorily represented, he
must say that the perceiver sees simply two lines of unequal length.
What he simply sees cannot be the length of the lines in the figure
for they do not satisfy the description, the two lines are of equal
length. If he wants to maintain the existence condition, he must posit
the existence of some other (presumably mental) item that fits the
description. This seems unpromising and, moreover, it runs counter
to the doctrine of direct perception advocated by Dretske.
The second difficulty with the answer that exploits the notion
of systemic indicator function is that it does not achieve what it is
meant to achieve, namely to dispense with the need to posit a third
level of content. For it seems that just as, to borrow one of Dretske’s
favorite examples, one can see an American flag without noticing all
fifty stars on it, one can see the Müller-Lyer figure without noticing
the length of the lines. So it appears that seeing simply the Müller-
Lyer figure and seeing the two lines in the figure as unequal in length
are two different things after all.
We shall have to spell out in detail what the difference consists
in. But first, let us examine a second set of examples, namely the
phenomena referred to by the Gestalt psychologists as “grouping”.6
Grouping phenomena can be illustrated by the fact that we some-
times perceive arrays of dots as arranged in rows or in columns (see
Figure 2). In some cases we can perceive one and the same array as
differently grouped in successive experiences.
What would Dretske say about such phenomena? He cannot say
that seeing an array of dots as arranged, say, in rows is an instance
of simple seeing because, once again, a perceiver could see the
dots without noticing their particular arrangement. Moreover, the
same array can sometimes be perceived as differently grouped in
successive experiences and yet it seems that there is something
that remains constant in the successive experiences, in other words
it seems that there is some level of classification at which the
successive experiences fall under the same type. Presumably, the
idea of simple seeing should rather be used to capture what the
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Figure 2. Groupings.
successive experiences have in common. Should we say then that
seeing an array of dots as arranged in rows constitutes an instance
of cognitive seeing? Now it is true that in the very description of
the case, I made use of the concept of a row, and it is also true that
normal mature humans possess the concept of a row. These two facts
may incline us to consider the case as a case of cognitive seeing.
However, as pointed out by Peacocke (1983), Gestalt psycholo-
gists have also given numerous examples of grouping phenomena in
which there are distinctive grouping properties, groupings in partic-
ular curves and shapes, and in which the subject of the experience
has no concept in advance with which to pick out the curve or
shape in question.7 Given those examples, it seems that although,
presumably, normal mature humans possess the concept of a row,
possessing the concept is not a necessary condition for being able to
perceive an array of dots as arranged in rows.
Another reason for doubting that we are confronted with an
instance of cognitive seeing in Dretske’s sense is that a subject
could perceive an array of dots as arranged in rows without thereby
believing that they are in fact arranged in rows. He may, for instance,
believe that his seeing the array as arranged in rows depends on his
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particular viewpoint, and that, were he to change his viewpoint, he
would not perceive the array as arranged in rows anymore. Think,
for instance, of constellations. Traditionally, stars that look close
to one another have been grouped in constellations and sometimes
named after the pattern they seem to form. Yet, the stars that are
grouped together are sometimes very far away and can even belong
to different galaxies. The Big Dipper (Ursa Major), for instance,
contains both stars from galaxy M81 and from the planetary nebula
M97. Thus, an astronomer may see star  as half-way between star
 and star γ , and yet fail to believe that star  is indeed half-way
between star  and star γ . It appears then that seeing elements in
a scene as arranged in a certain way can neither be considered as
an instance of simple seeing nor as an instance of cognitive seeing.
Rather, it should be conceived of as a third way of seeing things,
intermediate between those two modes of perceiving.
3
It is now time to get more precise as to what this intermediate way
of seeing consists in. Let us note first that, although optical illusions
may be infrequent encounters, Gestalt phenomena of organization
are ubiquitous features of visual experiences. They include not only
groupings, but also figure/ground organization, the fixing of refer-
ence frames, as well as various perceptual constancies, apparent
motion, induced motion, and a host of other contextual effects.8
When we perceive a visual scene as organized in a certain way,
certain structures, properties or relations in the scene are made
salient. Those features of the scene are given special emphasis in
our perceptual representation. This level of representation differs
from sensory representation as characterized by Dretske in that
some of the information is, so to speak, pre-digitalized. However,
predigitalization of information can result from the operation of
built-in bottom-up processes of visual analysis. Work in the field
of computational vision provides evidence for the existence of such
processes.
For instance, in his recent book on high-level vision (1996)
Shimon Ullman discusses a number of processes that may be
supposed to be operating in the construction of such intermediate
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Figure 3. Salient structures. Reprinted with permission from S. Ullman,
High-Level Vision, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996, p. 244.
perceptual representations. Ullman’s discussion of visual routines
and of the related notions of a processing focus and of selective
visual attention may help us give a more precise characterization
of what is involved in the idea of an intermediate level of percep-
tual content. Ullman defines visual routines as those operations
that, when applied to a set of early visual representations, yield
a representation of spatial properties and relations. The resulting
representations can then be used not only for the tasks of object
recognition and classification, but also for other tasks – tasks that do
not require object recognition, such as manipulating objects, plan-
ning and executing movements in the environment, selecting and
following a path, and so on. Among the candidate basic operations
discussed by Ullman is the capacity to control the location at which
certain operations take place, that is to direct the processing focus.9
Of direct relevance to the characterization of intermediate percep-
tual representations is the evidence in favor of task-independent,
stimulus-driven shifts of attention. For instance, if we look at images
such as those of Figure 3, it appears that our attention is somehow
immediately drawn to the main object(s). In Figure 3a, our attention
is immediately drawn to the car, which we then recognize as a car,
without the need to scan the image systematically. Moreover, struc-
tures that attract our attention need not be recognizable objects, as
illustrated in Figure 3b.
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This way of directing the processing focus is based on the
extraction of certain salient locations in the image, and then
shifting the processing focus to one of these distinguished loca-
tions. According to Ullman, simple differences in a small number of
properties – properties such as motion, orientation, color, contrast,
binocular disparity, that are processed “pre-attentively” in a parallel
and a bottom-up manner – can be used to define distinguished
locations that will automatically draw attention, thus leading to
further processing of information at these locations. The perceptual
representations resulting from the operation of such processes are
structured representations in the sense that information at certain
distinguished locations is further processed, thereby allowing for
the establishment of certain spatial properties and relations of the
layout. Yet those perceptual representations may not be cognitive in
Dretske’s sense insofar as the processes producing them can operate
in bottom-up fashion, yielding a way of perceiving that is devoid of
cognitive content.
It is now time to give a more systematic account of what
the differences are between this intermediate level of content and
sensory content on the one hand and conceptual content on the other,
and of what role this content can play in our cognitive life. Recall
that, according to Dretske, what characterizes sensory states is that
they are states (1) whose representational properties are systemic,
(2) whose content is encoded in analog form and (3) whose function
it is to supply information to a cognitive system for calibration and
use in the control and regulation of behavior. Intermediate percep-
tual representations differ from sensory representations in Dretske’s
sense in that they do not satisfy condition (2). In intermediate
perceptual representations, part of the information provided by the
sensory representations is predigitalized: certain spatial properties
and relations of the perceived layout are made salient, while more
specific pieces of information about the layout are ignored.
Yet, intermediate perceptual representations may be said to
satisfy both conditions (1) and (3). The ubiquity of Gestalt
phenomena of perceptual organization suggests that, to a certain
extent, they also reflect built-in processes of visual analysis. For
instance, psychological studies of infant perception (Spelke, 1990;
Spelke et al., 1993; Spelke et al., 1995) provide evidence that
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the ability to perceive figure-ground relations as well as object
unity and boundaries exists at an early age and that infants are
sensitive to constraints of cohesion, boundedness, rigidity and no
action at a distance. If infants have unlearned abilities to perceive
figure-ground relations and to organize surface arrays into bodies
that are cohesive and bounded, the representational properties of
intermediary perceptual states may be said to be systemic or
phylogenetically determined in Dretske’s sense.
Intermediate perceptual representations also seem to satisfy the
third condition laid out by Dretske for sensory perception, namely
to have the function of supplying information to a cognitive system
for calibration and use in the control and regulation of behavior.
The information supplied by those representations can be used by
the cognitive system for multiple purposes. It is useful for tasks
such as manipulating objects, planning actions, navigating in the
environment. It also plays an important role in memory, as well
as for object identification and classification. Moreover, depending
on what the task is, the information can be recalibrated in different
ways. For instance, classifying shapes according to the type of hand
grasping they afford will not yield the same results as classifying
those shapes for the purpose of object-categorization. The fact that
intermediate perceptual representations involves a predigitalization
of sensory information does not imply that this predigitalized infor-
mation cannot be further digitalized to serve various functions in the
control and regulation of behavior.
On the other hand, Dretske characterizes cognitive perception as
the having of cognitive, belief-like, states with conceptual content,
that is, states whose representational properties are acquired, whose
content is encoded in digital form and whose function it is to
control and regulate behavior. One reason why intermediate percep-
tion does not qualify as cognitive perception in Dretske’s sense
is that intermediate perception is not belief-like. One important
feature of beliefs is that they are normally revisable in the light
of other, contrary, beliefs. But, as the Müller-Lyer illusion shows,
intermediate perceptions are not revisable in the way beliefs are.
Thus, although intermediate perceptions can give rise to beliefs, they
should not be confused with the beliefs they give rise to.
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But what of the respective contents of the two types of states? Do
we have any reason to think that these contents are of different types,
that cognitive perceptions but not intermediate perceptions are states
with conceptual content? Prima facie, the fact that the contents of
the two types of states can be reported using the same construc-
tion, ‘perceiving . . . as . . . ’, may tempt us into thinking that both
encode the same content in the same way. But I think the temptation
should be resisted. What is true is that both types of states make
certain properties or relations salient. But this would be conclusive
evidence that both states have conceptual content only if concep-
tualization were the only way to achieve saliency. Now, the notion
of intermediate perceptual content is precisely meant to capture the
idea of a form of perceptual saliency that can be manifested prior
to and independently of the exercise of conceptual abilities. The
‘perceiving as’ construct can be used as a way of describing what is
made salient in a representation, without its use implying anything
as to how this representational saliency is achieved.
But what is it that distinguishes conceptual saliency from non-
conceptual saliency, and hence, conceptual content from non-
conceptual content? First, conceptual representations as conceived
by Dretske are digital in two different senses. They are digital
both in the particular sense Dretske gives to this notion – i.e. as a
specific mode of representation of a fact – and in the more common
sense of the term – i. e. as a specific way of encoding information
about a property. By contrast, intermediate perceptual representa-
tions are indeed partially digitalized in Dretske’s sense, but they
remain analogical representations in the ordinary sense. In other
words, some properties are made salient, but they are still encoded
analogically. Second, although, as Dretske himself acknowledges,
this dimension of beliefs is not emphasized in his theory, it is
characteristic of beliefs to be holistically related to one another by
inferential relations. As Tim Crane (1992) suggests, it is reasonable
to view concepts as the constituents of belief content that account
for these inferential relations. But, as the non-revisability of percep-
tion shows, perceptions are not subject to the inferential dynamics
typical of beliefs. This suggests that the content of perceptions is not
a type of conceptual content.
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What distinguishes intermediate perceptual states from sensory
states though, is that the former involve a predigitalization of infor-
mation, hence information that can sometimes be used in the control
of behavior by the cognitive systems without recalibration being
necessary. It may be thought that in acquiring certain simple obser-
vational concepts, such as perceptual shape concepts, cognitive
systems take advantage of this predigitalization of information. In
such cases, the conceptualization process might be described as a
process through which certain perceptually salient spatial proper-
ties and/or relations become endowed with behavioral significance.
Indeed, as Peacocke (1992) argues, it may be the case that we
need to posit such an intermediate level of perceptual content if
we are to have a noncircular and individuating account of mastery
of certain perceptual concepts. For that mastery must be related to
some features of experience that do not have to be explained in
terms that presuppose possession of the concepts. But it will not
do to relate the mastery to experiences with only sensory content in
Dretske’s sense. For although the sensory content of an experience
may carry information about the relevant properties of the layout, it
can do so without those properties being noticed or attended to by
the perceiver.
In this paper, I tried to argue in favor of the existence of an
intermediary level of perceptual content, a content that is structured
yet non-conceptual. But it is possible to put forward a more radical
claim, namely that this so-called intermediary level of perceptual
content is in fact the level of perceptual content. As a conclusion, let
me offer some considerations in favor of this more radical claim. If,
as I tried to show, seeing-as is not to be taken as synonymous with
conceptualizing, the traditional motivations for resisting the view
that all seeing is seeing-as are largely undermined. One may wonder
whether simple perception conceived as a purely analogical matrix
of information really provides an adequate characterization of our
conscious sensory experience. It may seem more appropriate to
conceive of it as a characterization of what Ullman (1996) calls low-
level representations – i.e. subpersonal representations computed at
the early processing stages of perception – and hence, as suggested
by Meini (1996), to conceive of it as a form of pre-perception rather
than as perception properly so-called. On the other hand, despite
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their name, cognitive perceptions as described by Dretske may be
more appropriately characterized as belief-states – namely, a type
of belief that is based on perceptual evidence – than as percep-
tual states. This is not to deny that our cognitive expectations and
conceptual abilities can influence the way we perceive things. It may
be mistaken to think, however, that when, for instance, as a result of
our prior expectation that there are dogs around, we come to see
something as a dog, the concept dog must figure as a constituent of
the content of our perception. Another possibility, consistent with
the view of perceptual content as structured non-conceptual content
put forward here, is that mastery of (partly) observational concepts
consists in part in their being associated with a set of perceptual
processing routines designed to extract specific spatial relations or
shape properties. Hence seeing something as a dog as a result of
prior expectations concerning dogs would not mean that the content
of our perception has the concept dog as a constituent, but that
certain shape properties of the visual scene are made salient as a
result of the application of a particular set of processing routines. In
the case at hand, application of these routines is indeed influenced
by our cognitive expectations, but this does not provide sufficient
ground for claiming that the content of the perception is conceptual,
since, in other circumstances, the very same routines could have
been applied in the absence of specific cognitive expectations. The
fact that we had prior cognitive expectations and that these expecta-
tions influenced the application of perceptual processing routines
may explain why, in most cases, our perceptual experience imme-
diately gives rise to a perceptual belief involving the concept dog
as a constituent, but it does not make the content of the perception
conceptual content.
NOTES
1 As Dretske himself insists, this should not be taken to mean that seeing X
non-epistemically is incompatible with beliefs about X, but rather that seeing X
non-epistemically is compatible with having no beliefs about X.
2 One important reason why Dretske needs a functional story for perception is
that he wants his account of simple seeing to be an account of visual experi-
ence. He needs therefore to distinguish those informational states that somehow
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constitute our visual experience from a variety of other intermediate stages in the
processing of visual information that lack this experiential quality.
3 Although Dretske (1988) introduces a new terminology, the distinction between
what a state indicates and what a state has the function of indicating corresponds
to his former distinction between the information a state carries and the semantic
content of a state, and the development of an indicator function corresponds to the
development of a semantic structure.
4 For a discussion of the Müller-Lyer illusion along similar lines, see Meini
(1996).
5 Michael Tye’s (1996) explanation of the Müller-Lyer illusion and other similar
optical illusions runs precisely along those lines.
6 Although the examples to be discussed are borrowed from Peacocke in the
first chapter of Sense and Content (1983), my aim is rather different from his.
Peacocke (1983) marshalled those examples in order to support his claim that
concepts of sensations are indispensable to the description of the nature of sense
experience and thus that we should distinguish between the sensational and the
representational properties of experience. In contrast, my aim is to distinguish
between two different types of perceptual representational content. It must be
said, however, that Peacocke has changed his views. In A Study of Concepts
(1992), he argues in favor of two levels of perceptual content: scenario content and
proto-propositional content. Indeed, there are important similarities between the
notion of proto-propositional content he advocates and the notion of intermediate
perceptual content I am arguing for.
7 See for instance Köhler (1947) and Rock (1975).
8 See for instance Rock (1983) and Palmer (1992).
9 In support of his view, Ullman adduces a number of psychological and
physiological studies which suggest that the focus of visual processing can be
directed, either voluntarily or by manipulating the visual stimulus, to different
spatial locations in the visual input. For psychological evidence, see for instance
Eriksen and Schultz (1977), Pomerantz et al. (1977), Posner (1980), Posner et al.
(1978), Shiffrin et al. (1976), Shulman et al. (1979), Sperling (1960), Treisman
(1977, 1982), Treisman and Gelade (1980), Tsal (1983). For neurophysiological
evidence, see for instance Goldberg and Wurtz (1972), Mountcastle (1976), Wurtz
et al. (1982).
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